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Abstract
We combine survey data on friendship networks and individual characteristics with
experimental observations from dictator games. Dictator offers are primarily explained by
social distance – giving follows a simple inverse distance law. While student demographics
play a minor role in explaining offer amounts, individual heterogeneity is important for
network formation. In particular, we detect significant homophilous behavior – students
connect to others similar to them. Moreover, the network data reveal a strong preference
for cliques – students connect to those already close. The study is one of the first to
identify network architecture with individual behavior in a strategic context.
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The recent empirical literature has identified the importance of social networks in diverse
environments such as technology adoption, job search, and crime.1 Despite the wealth of
fascinating data there are several inherent problems that appear in the empirical analysis
of networks. First, the strategic interactions that underlie field observations are usually
hard to pinpoint. Second, the attributes of individual nodes in the network tend to be
restricted or missing altogether. Third, the endogeneity of the network structure itself is
difficult to account for. These problems draw a wedge between the developing theory and the
extant empirical work studying the impacts of social structure on individual and collective
outcomes.2 The current paper contributes a first step toward connecting social network
structure and strategic behavior by combining standard survey techniques with controlled
experimentation.
We collected data from a unique population of 10 to 18 year old students in an all-girls
school in Pasadena, California. Our data set was assembled in two stages. In the initial
stage, we elicited the entire network of friendships, as well as a wide range of personal
characteristics of each of the girls, including height, race, confidence, shyness, etc. In the
second stage, we conducted an array of experimental dictator games with fifth and sixth
graders, varying the social distance between dictator and recipient as determined by the
length of the shortest path connecting them in their (elicited) network of friends.
We chose this subject pool since we wanted to conduct experiments in a self-contained
network where peer effects are important. Indeed, the impact of social networks on behav-
ior can likely be discerned only when the information about the network is accurate and
complete, which requires high levels of participation by the entire relevant population. Our
design allows us to play the dictator experiments with almost all students in the fifth and
sixth grades. Because 95% of them completed the social network survey we are able to
account for the entire network structure when analyzing giving behavior.3
Several insights come out of the analysis of our data. We find that dictator offers are
poorly explained by individual characteristics alone. The few characteristics that are signif-
icant indicate that shy subjects give and receive less while popular subjects (as measured
1E.g., Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul (2007), Antoni Calvo-Armengol, Eleonora
Patacchini, and Yves Zenou (forthcoming), Timothy Conley and Christopher Udry (forthcoming), Edward
Glaeser, Bruce Sacerdote, and Jose Scheinkman (1996), Mark Granovetter (1994), and Giorgio Topa (2001).
2Recent theoretical works investigating strategic interactions on networks include Glaeser and Scheinkman
(2002), Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Matthew Jackson, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Leeat Yariv (forth-
coming), and Arun Sundararajan (2006).
3By playing the game in the field we are able to sidestep many of the selection problems identified by
Steven Levitt and John List (2006) and we control for some of the experimental “context” by explicitly
measuring the nature of the existing network that the games are played within.
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by the number of subjects naming them as friends) give less but receive more. We find no
significant differences between kids in the fifth and sixth grades.4 The model’s explanatory
power dramatically improves once social distance is included: the regressions reveal a simple
inverse distance law of giving.
The second set of results pertains to the endogenous structure of the network itself. Using
a logit discrete choice model applied to the data from all grades, we assess what affects each
individual link’s creation, given the network in place (a notion reminiscent of stability).
We find that by and large links are significantly more likely between students with similar
attributes. This is consistent with the wide sociology literature identifying homophily, the
tendency of people to connect with those similar to them (for a survey and references,
see Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James Cook, 2001). Hence, while personal
characteristics do not directly affect strategic outcomes they may have an important indirect
effect by determining the friends one ultimately interacts with. We also uncover evidence
for a form of preferential attachment manifesting itself as a strong preference for cliques:
students like to link to those that are already “close.”
To summarize, our study serves as one of the first to identify the importance of the un-
derlying social network for dictator generosity. More generally, the combination of survey
techniques (to elicit student demographics and friendship networks) and controlled experi-
mentation allows for a careful measurement of network or peer effects in strategic situations.
As such, our approach should prove useful in evaluating some of the recent theoretical work
that investigates the interplay of social structure and strategic play.
Furthermore, the analysis suggests a mechanism by which individual attributes affect
outcomes. Namely, attributes can help determine one’s neighborhood of friends (i.e., the
number of direct friends, friends of friends, etc.), which can in turn affect outcomes.
Finally, our paper relates to a strand of the anthropology literature investigating giving
behavior. Our findings suggest a possible alternative to the “culture” effects observed in dic-
tator games played with members of small scale societies around the world (Joseph Henrich
et al., 2001). It seems reasonable to assume that these small scale societies differ in terms
of the underlying network structure, in particular in terms of average distances. Our results
predict that in a more tightly-knit society, more generous dictator offers can be expected.
4In important studies with children ranging in age between 7 and 18, William Harbaugh and Kate Krause
(2000) show that students who have been at the same school longer give more to class mates and Harbaugh,
Krause and Steven Liday (2003) find that older children make larger offers in dictator and ultimatum games.
These authors suggest that children internalize social norms during childhood. Since their study does not
include information about the children’s friends, they cannot determine to what extent student behavior
stems from generalized norms or from social preferences.
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I.A. Related Literature
There are several recent papers that connect experimental games with social networks.
Specifically, Steve Leider, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat, Quoc-Anh Do (forthcoming)
pioneered the methodology of network elicitation followed by a controlled altruism exper-
iment. They obtained a social network of college students and illustrated that dictators
give more to “friends,” i.e., recipients with social distance equal to 1.5 Pablo Bran˜as-Garza,
Miguel Dura´n, and Maria Espinosa (2005) replicate this finding under weaker conditions:
they compare giving behavior when dictators are matched with one of their friends (not
knowing which friend) or with a stranger.6 This alternative setup allows them to rule out
the possibility that generous giving occurs because the dictator knows the recipient’s identity
and personal characteristics.7
Our study directly adds to this literature by looking at a very different subject pool that,
in particular, allows us to analyze network effects across ages. Importantly, our methods
and results differ in several crucial ways. First, our evidence comes from a self-contained
social network. Compared to the previous studies our results show a dramatic effect of
social distance on dictator giving, possibly because the social networks of 10-12 year olds
are concentrated at their school (unlike, for example, college students who may have some
friends at home, at the place they work, etc.). Second, besides eliciting data on friendships,
we also gathered information about individual students’ characteristics. This allows us to
correct for the effects of the recipient’s characteristics on the dictator’s offer (if any such
effects exist). Third, there are several elements of our design that mitigate or eliminate the
possibility of strategic reciprocity.8
Another related strand of literature pertains to the formation of social networks. Denise
5Leider, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Do (forthcoming) study several versions of the dictator game in which
they vary the amount received by the recipient when the dictator gives up part of the pie (see James Andreoni
and John Miller, 2002). Their main interest is to define and measure “social capital,” defined as the extent
to which subjects are able to internalize the externalities that arise from dictator giving.
6The experiments were conducted during class and subjects were paid in terms of credit toward their
grades.
7Bran˜as-Garza, Ramon Cobo-Reyes, Natalia Jime´nez, and Giovanni Ponti (2006) report results from a
related setup in which dictators have some (known) chance of being matched with one of their friends (not
knowing which friend) or a stranger. In this case, dictator giving does not significantly increase with the
chance of being matched with a friend. The aforementioned studies are further evaluated by Bran˜as-Garza
and Espinosa (2006).
8Dictators were randomly matched with three of their friends, three friends of friends, and four strangers.
Dictators made ten allocation decisions in our design, one of which was randomly selected by us to determine
actual payments. Moreover, all subjects played the roles of dictators as well as recipients simultaneously,
which should balance out any claims for ex-post favors. Finally, subjects’ payments from being a dictator or
a recipient were collected in envelopes, which they were supposed to take home before opening them several
days after the experiment.
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Kandel (1978) followed adolescents over time and documented the interplay between social
connections and four behavioral attributes: frequency of current marijuana use, level of
educational aspirations, political orientation, and participation in minor delinquency. David
Marmaros and Bruce Sacerdote (2006) illustrated that geographical and racial proximity
are key determinants of friendships in a population of students and recent graduates of
Dartmouth. Similarly, Aldabert Mayer and Steven Puller (2008) use Facebook data on Texas
A & M college students and document that proximity of major, dorm, and race are significant
proxies for friendship formation. These studies are consistent with the similarity-based
connections that we observe when eliciting a wide range of demographic and psychological
characteristics across different age groups. Interestingly, we also find evidence for a form of
preferential attachment that complements the tendency to connect to those who are similar,
and is in line with recent theoretical models of network formation (e.g., Albert-Laszlo Barbasi
and Reka Albert, 1999, and Jackson and Brian Rogers, 2007).
Our study also contributes to an ongoing debate regarding giving behavior in the dic-
tator “game,” where the typical outcome is that dictators give up non-negligible amounts.9
“Dictator generosity” has inspired theories of other-regarding preferences that incorporate
notions of fairness into the standard utility-maximizing paradigm.10 Complementing these
preference-based explanations, further experimentation has investigated the effects of “social
context” on dictator giving. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith (1996)
vary the instructions and administration of the dictator game so that each variation makes
the game a closer approximation of standard social interactions. They find that lowering the
degree of the dictator’s anonymity results in more generous offers, and conjecture that a less
anonymous experimental design evokes levels of strategic reciprocity common to everyday
repeated social interactions. Iris Bohnet and Bruno Frey (1999), however, provide evidence
that dictator generosity is driven not by reciprocity but by the ability to identify with the
recipients, whether by knowing something about them or seeing their faces. Likewise, Char-
ness and Uri Gneezy (2008) show that recipients (located in a different city) identified by
their family names receive significantly larger amounts.11
These experiments are suggestive of the importance of “social distance” in explaining
9See Gary Bolton, Elena Katok, and Rami Zwick (1998) for an overview of early dictator game exper-
iments, including Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986) and Robert Forsythe, Joel
Horowitz, Savin, and Martin Sefton (1994).
10See, e.g., Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000), and Gary Charness
and Matthew Rabin (2002).
11Deborah Small and Uri Simonsohn (forthcoming) find that knowing a “victim” increases dictator giving
to another victim of the same misfortune.
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dictator giving, where social distance is taken to be synonymous with anonymity.12 However,
Martin Dufwenberg and Astrid Muren (2006) demonstrate that reducing anonymity, by
paying dictators in public, lowers the amount given even when recipients are visible or
known to the dictator. Dufwenberg and Muren conclude that “...it is problematic to organize
experimental data in terms of social distance if this notion is taken to vary one-to-one with
anonymity.” In this paper, we follow their suggestion and instead formally define social
distance as the geodesic distance in the elicited network of friends.
I.B. Structure of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey used to elicit the network
of friendships and students’ demographics and the protocol for the dictator experiments. In
section 3, we report regression results to explain observed dictator offers. Section 4 analyzes
the determinants of network formation, i.e., what causes a link between two subjects to be
formed. Section 5 reports simulation results showing the effects of network position and
individual characteristics on students’ welfare. Section 6 concludes. Summary statistics
of our data can be found in Appendix A. Appendix B contains the instructions, dictator
decision sheet, and survey.
II. Design and Protocols
We collected data from students at an all-girls school in Pasadena, California. Our design
was comprised of two components. We first conducted a survey among all students (grades 5
through 12) eliciting their network of friends and their personal characteristics. Four months
later, we conducted an array of dictator experiments with girls from grades 5 and 6.
II.A. Student Characteristics and Friendship Survey
The survey was conducted in January 2006. We approached teachers with the request to
give up 10 to 15 minutes of class time at the start of a class. Students were instructed not
to talk while filling out the survey nor glance at others’ responses. One of us was present
to monitor and to answer any questions about the survey. The response rate in the entire
population was 77%. In grades five and six, two out of forty students were absent, so for
this group the response rate was 95%.
12In the words of Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996), social distance is “... a sense of coupling between
the dictator and her counterpart, or others who know the dictator’s decision.”
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Figure 1. Network of fifth and sixth graders.
Key: Nodes are sized according to degree and the different symbols indicate race:
Caucasian (red circle), Asian (blue triangle), Mixed (gray diamond), and Other (green
square). Thin (light grey) lines indicate one-way links, thick (dark grey) lines indicate
two-way links.
The survey (see Appendix B) consists of two parts: questions (1-11) concerning individual
characteristics and questions (12-14) concerning friendships. The former include height, age,
number of siblings, personality traits, and a few questions regarding physical appearance
(e.g., hair and eye color and whether the student wears braces). In the final three questions,
students were asked to name up to five friends and indicate how much time was spent with
each. In addition, they were asked how much time they spent with other friends (possibly
from a different school) not addressed in questions 12-14 and how much time they spent
doing extra-curricular activities (e.g., playing an instrument, sports, etc.).
The summary statistics for the entire population are contained in Appendix A. Here
we list some relevant statistics for fifth and sixth graders that play a role in our analysis
of giving behavior below. The grades 5-6 subject pool is predominantly Caucasian (51%),
followed by Asian (27%), and Mixed (16%). The remaining 6% are split between African-
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American, Middle-Eastern, and Hispanic. The average height is 4’11” (ranging from 4’1” to
5’9”). Ages range from 10 to 12 years old (with an average of 10.8); the number of siblings
ranges from 1 to 4 (average 1.1); 30% wear glasses and 40% wear braces. The questions
concerning personality characteristics show answers ranging from 1 (corresponding to the
most left bubble in question 11) to 5 (corresponding to the most right bubble in question
11) with means of 2.9 (optimistic), 2.5 (extroverted), 2.4 (confident), and 2.3 (outgoing),
respectively.13
Subjects reported anywhere from 2 to 5 friends (where 5 is the maximum by design)14
with an average of 4.4. The resulting friendship network is displayed in Figure 1, where
the nodes are sized by degree and the different symbols represent race. The left cluster
corresponds to grade 6, whereas the right cluster corresponds to grade 5. A thin (light grey)
directed arrow is drawn from subject i to j when i names j as a friend but not vice versa,
and a thick (dark grey) line is drawn when both i and j name each other as a friend. The
data from the time estimates (questions 13 and 14) are used in the simulation approach of
section 5 to provide a measure of how much time is spent with friends vis-a`-vis friends of
friends.
II.B. Dictator Game Experiment
The experiments were conducted on April 20th, 2006. We ran the dictator games with fifth
and sixth graders during four separate classes, each of size 20. In each of these classes the
teacher would start by taking 10 subjects outside after which we would read the instruc-
tions to the remaining ten subjects in the class (the instructions for the dictator game are
simple and standard, see Appendix B). Subjects were allowed to ask questions during the
instructions phase and afterward. We then handed out envelopes (labeled by name) that
contained 10 decision sheets (see Appendix B), each sheet indicating the name of the dictator
and that of the recipient.15 Each dictator had to take a numbered decision sheet out of her
envelope, record her allocation decision (i.e., how to split $6 between her and the recipient)
and then take out the next decision sheet. After all ten allocation decisions had been made
13One possible concern about these psychological measures is that answers would cluster around a focal
answer. It is not the case that the majority of individuals chose the median answer. The percentages choosing
the median answer of 3 were 38% (optimistic), 33% (extroverted), 35% (confident), and 23% (outgoing).
14While the majority of subjects do report five friends, this constraint seems to have had little effect on
the substantive conclusions. All of the analysis reported in the paper were repeated on a sample restricted
to those who reported less than five friends, yielding similar estimates and conclusions. The results are
available from the authors upon request.
15In other words, decision making is not anonymous: the dictator knows the identity of the recipient but
not vice versa. Of course, the recipient’s name had to be disclosed in order to capture network effects.
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the decision sheets were put back in the envelopes.16 One of us would then roll a ten sided
die and mark the decision sheet to be used for actual payment. Once all ten dictators were
finished they were asked to join their teacher outside, at which point the other ten subjects
played the game. The allocated class time (one hour) proved more than sufficient to run the
games with two groups of ten dictators.
After the dictator game experiments were completed in all four classes, we took the
envelopes with us to determine actual payments. We returned the envelopes the next day,
which now contained only the subjects’ payments from the experiment (total payment from
all selected decisions in which the subject appeared in the role of dictator or recipient) plus an
additional $2 that served as a “show up fee.”17 All subjects played the role of both dictator
and recipient so it would be hard for a dictator to extract favors from anyone that appeared
on her list of recipients, since the recipient could credibly claim to have already returned
that favor. The subjects received their envelopes a few days later and were instructed to
bring these home before opening them.
Of special interest is the matching protocol we used. To be able to discern the effects
of social distance on giving, we matched each dictator with three friends (distance 1), three
friends-of-friends (distance 2), and four others (distance 3 or higher). We borrowed this
design element from the innovative study of Leider, Mobius, Rosenblat and Do (forthcoming)
who conducted dictator games and network surveys among college undergraduates.
III. Experimental Results
In this section, we describe the results derived from the experimental segment of our design.
Here, we take the elicited network of friendships as given. In Section 4 below we analyze the
determinants of the network itself.
III.A. Explaining Giving Behavior by Individual Characteristics
Average offers in our experiment were 34% (approximately $2 of the $6), which is larger than
standard results but comparable to average offers of 27% reported by Charness and Gneezy
(2003), where subjects make offers to a recipient identified by family name.18 Furthermore,
16This within-subject design enables us to more accurately measure the effects of social distance on giving
behavior and to generate enough data from the sample of fifth and sixth graders.
17This amount was suggested to ensure no subject had to feel her friends were not generous toward her.
18This difference has an intuitive explanation: Charness and Gneezy’s subjects were playing with individ-
uals in a different town, while our subjects know the recipients socially.
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offers to strangers (defined as those of distance 3 or greater) in our experiment were 18%
on average, which is comparable to average amounts reported in other dictator experiments.
In our experiment, the game theoretic prediction of making no offers is seen in 36% of the
offers to strangers, which is consistent with numbers reported by Hoffman, McCabe and
Smith (1996) for their single-blind treatment.
We first analyze offer amounts using only individual characteristics collected from our
survey to explain the share of the pie ($6) given to the recipient. Height controls for each
individual’s deviation from the mean height, shy controls for individuals’ deviation from
mean shyness, asian is a dummy equal to 1 if the participant’s race is Asian, and popular
proxies for a student’s popularity by counting the number of people who call that student
a friend. We also control for the recipient’s characteristics: shy recipient represents the
recipient’s deviation from the mean shyness, popular recipient controls for the deviation of
the recipient from the mean in-degree measure, samerace is 1 if the dictator and recipient
are of the same race and sameheight is 1 if both dictator and recipient are above or below
the mean height. Sameconf is 1 if both dictator and recipient are above or below the average
on ranking how confident they are. The results are summarized in Table 1.19 Since each
individual makes 10 separate decisions, we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
that take into account the cluster structure of the data.20
Of the demographic and network variables, only the survey measure assessing the “shy-
ness” of a subject is significant at the 5% level. Popular students (as measured by their
indegrees) receive slightly larger offers suggesting a “popularity premium.”21 Note that
the individual and pair characteristics all represent relatively small effects. Moreover, the
explanatory power of the model is poor (R2 = .05).22
III.B. Explaining Giving Behavior by Individual and Network Characteristics
To glean some insight into the importance of social distance on giving behavior we computed
the mean amount given for distances ranging from 1 to 10 (we pooled the data for distances
19Table 1 reports results from an OLS regression. We find qualitatively similar results from an ordered
probit regression: asian 0.248 (0.164), shy -0.157 (0.075), shy recipient -0.034 (0.042), popular -0.051 (0.039),
popular recipient 0.048 (0.020), samerace -0.058 (0.104), sameheight 0.002 (0.091), sameconf 0.100 (0.092).
20Similar estimates (not reported) were obtained using a random effects model. We also estimated a fixed-
effects model but could not reject the null hypothesis that the fixed-effects model and the random-effects
model were similar (using a Hausman test at the 5% significance level).
21If the dictator game proxies for a typical social interaction where giving is common, one possible expla-
nation is that shy students give less because they participate less in standard social interactions.
22We also considered the importance of individual demographic variables in giving, restricted to offers
made to friends only and offers made to strangers only. Even after this conditioning on social distance,
dictator and recipient demographics cannot explain offer amounts.
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Variable
Share of 6$
Model 1 Model 2
delta (δ) 0.356***
(0.040)
gamma (γ) -0.852***
(0.153)
order -0.047***
(0.009)
height -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
asian 0.057 0.039
(0.039) (0.040)
shy -0.037** -0.036**
(0.018) (0.018)
shy_recipient -0.010 -0.001
(0.01) (0.009)
popular -0.011 -0.017
(0.009) (0.012)
popular_recipient 0.010** -0.003
(0.005) (0.004)
samerace -0.014 -0.022
(0.024) (0.022)
sameheight 0.005 -0.006
(0.021) (0.018)
sameconf 0.028 0.006
(0.022) (0.019)
closeness -0.011
(0.009)
betweenness 0.003
(0.002)
power -0.002
(0.007)
Constant 0.324*** 0.156***
(0.020) (0.037)
Observations 629 629
R-squared 0.05 0.29
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Table 1. Explaining dictator offers by personal traits only
(model 1) and by including network variables (model 2).
greater than 10 for which we have relatively fewer data).23 The results are displayed in
Figure 2, where each of the 11 bars reflects the mean share of the pie that was offered and
the error bars indicate twice the standard deviation (the theoretical black line is discussed
below). Clearly, offers significantly decline with distance.
The effect of distance is captured in the regressions by including a term δdγ, where γ < 0
reflects the decaying effect of social connection as distance increases. An additional measure
of social distance is captured by the variable order, which refers to the order (1-5) a first-
degree friend was listed (see question 12 of the survey in Appendix B). In the estimations,
23Recall that we measure social distance as the minimum number of “steps” between any two individuals
in Figure 1. A distance of 1 indicates (direct) friends, a distance of 2 indicates indirect friends (friends of
friends who are not direct friends), etc. When individuals are not connected by the network their distance
is coded 1001.
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Figure 2. Observed and predicted offers by social distance.
the variable order is coded as the deviation from the mean. We also include three standard
measures of network structure. Betweenness measures the share of times an individual is
between any two other individuals on a path over all paths in the network, closeness is the
sum of the inverse distance from i to all other individuals in the network and power is a
measure of the centrality of other individuals when i is removed from the network (see Phil
Bonacich, 1987). For each of these three network variables we take the deviation from the
mean as the explanatory variable. We take into account the panel structure, using a clustered
design, and report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The results are summarized in
the right-most column of Table 1.
Shy is still significant, but remains small in size. The three social network structure
measures are not statistically significant and represent very weak effects. One possible ex-
planation is that for these measures to play a role, subjects would effectively need to under-
stand the entire network structure, which is unlikely the case in practice. The social distance
measures, in contrast, represent very large effects. The model estimates that strangers, i.e.,
those of infinite distance, will receive 16% of the pie while a second-degree friend receives
an additional 20% and another 16% is added for the median first-degree friend. Moving
one deviation below the mean in the ordering of friends is equivalent to losing 5% of the
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pie. None of the partner characteristics are significant when we include controls for social
distance. In particular, the effects of the partner’s popularity vanish. Finally, note the
dramatic improvement in fit once social distance is included (R2 = .29).
The variation in offer amounts across different recipients is not driven by only a few
individuals. Most individuals showed substantial variation in offer amounts across the re-
cipients they faced. Only 5% of the individuals who participated in the experiment offered
the same amount to all recipients. We also consider the distribution of offers conditional
on social distance. Figure 3 shows that the distribution of offers for recipients of distance
1 (friends), distance 2 (friends-of-friends), and those of distance greater than 3 (strangers).
Note that the offer distributions are ranked in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance,
which illustrates that dictators make a clear distinction between friends, friends-of-friends,
and strangers.
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
amount
Social Distance 1 Social Distance 2
Social Distance >2
Empirical CDF by Social Distance
Figure 3. Empirical Distributions by Social Distance.
Compared to other studies our results show a dramatic effect of social distance on dicta-
tor giving, possibly because the social networks of 10-12 year olds are concentrated at their
school. Another reason could be that ingroup/outgroup effects are much more pronounced
among adolescents – relative differences between giving to friends and others may be exagger-
ated at age 12. To summarize, introducing controls for social distance significantly improves
the fit of the model and introduces large and significant effects, particularly in comparison
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with the individual and pair effects reported above. The equation governing dictator giving
in terms of social distance may be neatly summarized as24
share given =
1
6
(
1 +
2
d
)
.
The predictions of this inverse distance law of giving are superimposed in Figure 2.
IV. Determinants of Network Formation
The previous section suggests the potential significance of the underlying social network for
individual outcomes. In fact, personal characteristics had far weaker predictive power than
network attributes in determining strategic behavior. Nonetheless, personal characteristics
may have an important (albeit indirect) role in determining outcomes by affecting the social
network at place, and thus the type, in terms of social distance, of interactions an agent
with certain characteristics experiences.
Our data allow us to measure the effects of individual characteristics on linking choices.
Furthermore, we observe links made by students from all grades (373 students in total), not
just grades 5 and 6. We analyze subjects’ linking choices with a logit discrete choice model:
for every link made by a subject we evaluate its “value” and compare it to the values of
other links the subject could have made (holding fixed all other links in the network). This
has the flavor of stability in the sense that if a subject had a more valuable link available
than one of her existing links, we would expect her to shift social resources to that link and
the network would not be stable.
Consider first a model where link values are determined by individual characteristics
alone. In particular, suppose a link from subject i to j has a value vij that is a function of
i’s and j’s characteristics vij = f(Xi, Xj). Then, using a logit model, the probability that
this link occurs is given by
Pij =
evij∑
k e
vik
. (1)
Estimating this model using a clustered structure to take into account that each individual
makes five independent decisions to link to a friend, we find that individual and partner char-
acteristics a role primarily when the characteristics of i and j match up, see Table 2.25 This
is consistent with the extensive sociology literature on homophily, a phenomenon referring
24Note that the estimated parameters governing the social distance part are not significantly different from
1
6 ,
1
3 , and 1 respectively.
25We restrict logit choices to students within the same grade, which captures almost all data. The dummy
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to people’s apparent tendency to connect with others similar to them (for an overview, see
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, J. M., 2001).26 The one individual characteristic that
appears to affect the probability of linking is the height of the network partner. Individuals
are more likely to link to make friends with girls who are taller.
There are network effects that seem intuitively appealing and do not appear in the estima-
tion of equation (1). Following the network formation literature on preferential attachment
(see, e.g., Barabasi and Albert, 1999, and Jackson and Rogers, 2007, and references therein),
it is natural to entertain subjects’ preference to form cliques, i.e., subjects’ preference to link
to friends of friends. We model this by posing that the probability that i links to j depends
on the distance between i and j without the link. Table 2 incorporates these network or
distance effects into our logit model.27 For example, the dummy variable d2 is equal to 1 if,
without the direct link between i and j, there is already a path from i to j of length two. In
other words, j is already a friend-of-a-friend and a direct link from i to j closes the “triad.”
Finally, the dummy variables d3 and d4 are 1 if, without the direct link from i to j there is
already a path from i to j of length 3 or 4 respectively.
As in the previous section, the inclusion of network variables results in a dramatically
improved fit (the log likelihood increases by roughly 1400 or 25%). Students seem to have a
strong preference to link to those that are already close. The resulting “cliques” are apparent
from the network graph in Figure 1. These observations are important when considering the
distance of agents one chooses to interact with. Indeed, girls in one’s clique are of short social
distance. Our experimental results suggest that dictator-like interactions with them are
expected to yield high returns relative to interactions with girls outside of the clique. Once
we account for network structure, the height of a partner is no longer a significant predictor of
making a link. In our data, height is weakly correlated with popularity (significant at 10%).
Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite and Dan Silverman (2004) find that height affects early
childhood confidence, which could also suggest a tendency for taller individuals to have more
friends. This relationship between height and popularity may also explain the fact that once
we control for the network position of existing partners, height is no longer an important
variable sameboyfriend is 1 if the girls that form the link both have a boyfriend. Other recipient charac-
teristics we tried include confident, shy, boyfriend, Asian, height, braces, glasses, and only child but none
of them are significantly different from 0, and neither are sameshy, sameonlychild, samebraces, sameglasses,
sameoptimistic, and sameextroverted.
26There are several recent studies that explore the foundations and impacts of similarity-based connections,
e.g., Sergio Currarini, Jackson, and Paolo Pin (forthcoming) and Mariagiovanna Baccara and Yariv, 2008.
27There are potential endogeneity issues when incorporating these variables in the estimations. Note,
however, that the non-network estimates do not change significantly when the network variables are included,
which provides evidence that the resulting estimates are not biased.
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Variable
Link
Model 1 Model 2
samerace 0.618*** 0.491***
(0.084) (0.084)
sameheight 0.263*** 0.289***
(0.064) (0.069)
sameconf 0.158** 0.158**
(0.066) (0.071)
sameboyfriend 0.683** 0.562**
(0.324) (0.225)
shy_recipient -0.019 0.030
(0.032) (0.035)
height_recipient 0.023** 0.010
(0.011) (0.013)
d 2 3.657***
(0.130)
d 3 0.940***
(0.169)
d 4 0.473***
(0.169)
Log Likelihood -5451.151 -4027.450
Observations 1753 1753
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Table 2. Explaining linking decisions by personal traits only
(model 1) and by including network variables (model 2).
predictor of making a link.28
IV.A. Network Position and Earnings
The homophilic preferences underlying linking choices together with the dependence of giving
behavior on social distance identified in the previous section, suggest the potential (indirect)
significance of individual characteristics on outcomes. To illustrate, note from Figure 1 that
Asian students tend to form cliques. Moreover, Table 1 shows that Asian students tend to
give more (although the result is not significant, possibly because of our matching protocol).
If each girl interacts with a fixed number of closest friends (or, alternatively, with all the
girls that are of particular distance from her) Asian students will, on average, receive higher
28One natural question (raised by a referee) is “if similar characteristics determine network formation
(model 1 in Table 2), and network positions determine giving (model 2 in Table 1), then why do we not
see a big effect of individual characteristics on the amounts given (model 1 in Table 1)?” For example, one
could characterize a certain clique in the network by two characteristics, i.e. a group of tall Asian girls. In
this clique, girls are “close” and give a lot to each other, so the interaction term sameheight × Asian could
be expected to be a significant explanatory variable for the amount given. Other cliques could be described
similarly by constructing interaction terms that involve two or more individual characteristics. We tried
several models that included interaction terms of this type, but found no improvement in fit. Basically, the
interaction terms filter out few subjects that satisfy multiple criteria, and our data set is not large enough to
produce significant effects. We do think that in a larger data set the network effects should be reproducible,
although less perfectly so, by considering individual characteristics.
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benefits in dictator-like settings. In other words, personal characteristics affect the type of
agents one interacts with and, hence, social distances, which in turn affect earning outcomes.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.05
0.1
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0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
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0.45
In-Degree
 
 
Normalized Earnings by In-degree
Share of Observations
Figure 4. Simulated earnings by popularity.
Actual earnings in the experiment exhibit some variance, but our design of randomly
choosing one of ten decisions effectively dampens out network or demographic effects. To
gain more insight into the connection between network position, individual characteristics,
and earnings, we simulate interaction over the entire network and generate a normalized
measure of the share of the $6 each individual is expected to receive. In particular, first we
predict offer amounts from i to j for all possible interactions in the network using the results
from estimating the inverse distance model in Section 2. Using survey responses, we next
generate a weight that represents the ratio of time spent on average with direct friends to the
total time spent with all friends. We then generate a weighted sum that represents the value
any individual is expected to receive from a pairwise interaction with any other member of
the network (we assume an individual is as likely to be a dictator as a recipient). We find
that these simulated average earnings have a strong positive relationship with in-degree or
popularity, see Figure 4.
Using the simulated earnings we are able to measure the importance of individual and
network characteristics, see Table 3. First, note that without the inclusion of network vari-
ables such as popularity, betweenness, closeness, and power, the model’s predictive power
is weak (left-column). Including the network variables (right-column) improves the fit dra-
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Variable
Simulated Received Earnings
Model 1 Model 2
height 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
asian 0.020 0.023*
(0.015) (0.013)
shy -0.003 0.005
(0.007) (0.006)
confident 0.005 0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
only child 0.024 0.018
(0.016) (0.014)
optimistic -0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.005)
braces 0.008 0.007
(0.013) (0.012)
glasses -0.028** -0.016
(0.013) (0.011)
popular 0.026***
(0.003)
between -0.003**
(0.001)
close 0.002
(0.002)
Power -0.000**
(0.000)
Constant 0.204*** 0.100***
(0.009) (0.013)
Observations 330 330
R-squared 0.03 0.28
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Table 3. Explaining earnings by personal traits only
(model 1) and by including network variables (model 2).
matically and predicts that the few most popular girls earn close to four times as much as
the least popular ones (see also Figure 4). In particular, each time a student is named by
someone else as a friend, their in-degree goes up by 1 and their normalized earnings by 2%.
This raises the normalized earnings from roughly 10% for someone who was never listed as
a friend to 32% for someone who was listed eleven times (the maximum in our sample) - a
more than three-fold increase.
Note that the value of being listed as a friend by one extra person is roughly the same
as the value of being Asian. The underlying reason is quite different, however, and ties back
to the homophilic preferences discussed above. Asian girls tend to form small cliques and
they tend to give more on average – as a result the normalized earnings of Asian girls are
higher. This illustrates our earlier argument for why individual traits (which do not explain
the amount given) are important in explaining subjects’ earnings – they affect linking choices
and average distances, which are the main determinants of giving behavior.
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V. Conclusion
We collected survey data on friendship networks and individual characteristics from the
entire student body at an all-girls school in Pasadena, California. In addition, we conducted
several dictator games with 5th and 6th graders, varying social distances between proposers
and receivers (using the elicited social network structure).
There are two main insights that shine through. First, network effects are extremely
important in explaining dictator behavior, far more so than any individual characteristic.
In fact, the data reveal a simple 1/d law of giving, where d denotes social distance between
a proposer and receiver. Second, individual characteristics are important in explaining the
network formation process. We identify strong homophilous behavior in that girls tend to
link to others similar to them.
These two insights suggest that social networks may constitute an important channel
through which personal characteristics affect outcomes. Indeed, personal characteristics
may affect the agents one faces (say, the number of direct friends, friends of friends, etc.)
in a variety of strategic interactions. These, in turn, play a crucial role in determining the
resulting outcomes.
More generally, the study contributes to the rapidly expanding literature pointing to the
importance of social networks to economic consequences. It provides one of the first to elicit
both network and personal attributes and tie them to a controlled strategic interaction.
The paper also provides a contribution to the literature on social capital (see, e.g., James
Coleman, 1990, Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, 1992, Glaeser,
David Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002, and references therein). While our population of sub-
jects is very particular, in view of the social capital literature, our results suggest that social
network characteristics may serve as a useful proxy for social capital (coarse network charac-
teristics, such as joint memberships in organizations, have, in fact, already been used in some
empirical work). In our setup, social capital captured in that way have power in explaining
outcomes, namely dictator giving. Furthermore, our results suggest that social capital for-
mation may be impacted by non-malleable physical characteristics. In particular, having an
attribute that is common in the population can ease the creation of close connections, since
similar individuals are easier to find, and consequently raise one’s potential for acquiring
social capital.
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Appendix A. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
grade 8.9 (5.5) 2.2 (0.5) 5 (5) 12 (6) 487 (80)
age 13.9 (10.9) 2.2 (0.7) 10 (10) 18 (12) 373 (76)
height 63.2 (58.8) 3.7 (3.4) 49 (49) 73 (69) 370 (75)
siblings 1.2 (1.1) 0.9 (0.8) 0 (1) 6 (4) 373 (76)
boyfriend 0.07 (0) 0.26 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 487 (76)
optimistic 3.0 (2.9) 1.0 (0.9) 1 (1) 5 (5) 368 (75)
extroverted 2.6 (2.5) 1.0 (1.0) 1 (1) 5 (5) 366 (75)
confident 2.7 (2.4) 1.0 (0.9) 1 (1) 5 (5) 368 (74)
outgoing 2.5 (2.3) 1.0 (1.0) 1 (1) 5 (4) 370 (74)
hours: friend 1 25.1 (25.0) 20.0 (17.4) 0 (1) 155 (64) 368 (75)
hours: friend 2 22.2 (21.7) 18.0 (15.6) 0 (1) 147 (56) 368 (75)
hours: friend 3 21.3 (21.0) 18.7 (15.5) 0 (1) 189 (50) 367 (74)
hours: friend 4 20.1 (19.6) 18.8 (15.4) 0 (0) 148 (50) 361 (69)
hours: friend 5 19.5 (21.0) 19.0 (16.1) 0 (0) 168 (56) 345 (63)
socializing 15.6 (12.8) 16.7 (15.7) 0 (0) 100 (80) 365 (72)
white 59.2% (50.7%) 368 (75)
black 3.8% (2.7%) 368 (75)
asian 22.6% (26.7%) 368 (75)
mixed 9.5% (16.0%) 368 (75)
hispanic 2.4% (2.7%) 368 (75)
in-degree 3.6 (4.4) 2.1 (2.4) 0 (0) 11 (10) 487 (76)
Number of friends 4.8 (4.7) 0.6 (0.7) 1 (2) 5 (5) 370 (76)
Number of Surveys 373 (76)
Table A1. Summary statistics for the entire population (and grades 5 and 6).
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Appendix B. Instructions, Decision Sheet, and Survey
Instructions: Welcome to this experiment! If you have any questions you may ask .
You are not allowed to talk with anyone except during the experiment.
We will ask everyone from this class to make a series of 10 decisions. For each decision,
you get a separate sheet of paper (numbered 1-10) that lets you divide $6 between yourself
and another student from this school: the name of the other student is printed on the sheet.
The other student might be someone in your class or someone from a different grade. On
each sheet you should write down how much you want to keep for yourself and how much
you want to give to the other student: any division is allowed as long as the numbers add
up to $6. When you are done, we will pick up your sheet and give you a new sheet, which
will have the name of a different student printed on it.
Once you made all 10 decisions, we will roll a ten-sided die to decide which of the 10
decision sheets to use. The amount you wrote down on this sheet to keep for yourself is
put in your ”money envelope” and the amount you wrote down on this sheet for the other
student is put in the other student’s ”money envelope.” No student in your class (or in a
different grade) will ever know their name was on your sheet or how much money you gave
to them.
After the experiment is done, each student will receive her own money envelope. The
amount of money in your envelope depends on how much you decided to keep for yourself
and how much others decided to give to you. The money in your envelope is yours to keep
and you do not have to tell anyone how much money you got.
Decision sheet (#1 out 10): Hello dictator’s name! Please choose how you want to divide
$6 between you and recipient’s name.
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Survey
Thank you for participating in this survey. Please be assured that your answers will 
be kept completely confidential and your identity will be protected. While your 
name is required for this survey, we assure you that your identity will not be 
disclosed to any third parties nor published.
1. What is your first and last name: _______________________________ 
2. How old are you? ___________ 
3. What grade are you in? ____________ 
4. How would you describe your race/ethnicity? ________________________ 
5. How tall are you? __________ft  ___________in 
6. How many siblings do you have? ____________ 
7. What color are your eyes?  Please circle one:    
  Blue        Brown         Green        Hazel 
8.  What color is your hair?  Please circle one:   
 Brown        Blonde      Black        Red 
9. Do you currently wear braces? Please circle one:          Yes           No 
10. Do you currently wear glasses? Please circle one:          Yes           No 
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